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INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, an individual’s personal records were beyond the government’s
grasp absent a showing of probable cause. 1 The legal standards that protected them
“evolved in a world where such records were almost universally in the actual
possession of the individual.”2 However, with today’s ever-expanding use of
technology3 and the ease with which highly intimate and sensitive information may be
acquired and compiled, 4 that world no longer exists. 5 Instead, the magnitude of
information sharing in the digital age has led to private, personal records not feeling
very private at all.
In an attempt to safeguard health information, Congress enacted the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 1996. 6 Specifically, the
HIPAA Privacy Rule prohibits the “inappropriate use and disclosure of [health]
information.” 7 Notably absent, however, is a private right of action.8 Thus, an
“individual whose information is improperly used or disclosed, according to HIPAA,
has no recourse” despite the “irreversible emotional and financial harm” caused by
privacy violations. 9 In an attempt to provide a remedy to victims of sensitive data
breaches, some state courts have allowed HIPAA to inform the applicable standard of

1

THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY 347 (July 1977).
2

Id.

3

Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283,
302 (2003) (“While digital technology can save money and allow life-saving medical
information to be instantly sent between hospitals and doctors, the same technology also
heightens the possibility of mistake or misuse.”) Devin W. Ness, Information Overload: Why
Omnipresent Technology and the Rise of Big Data Shouldn’t Spell the End for Privacy as We
Know It, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 925, 926 (“[T]he rapid development of information
technology in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has had a massive impact on most
people’s daily lives, especially in regard to personal communications, access to information,
and information transport and storage.”)
4

GRANT S. MCCLELLAN, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 164–65 (1976) (recognizing two trends
which have made it easy for medical records—at one point secure and privately stored in
doctors’ offices or hospitals—to be taken out and forwarded without consent: “the great surge
in computer technology” and “the growth of ‘third party’ involvement in health matters” such
as insurance or the Medical Information Bureau)
5

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193
(1890) (“Later there came a recognition of a man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and his
intellect. Gradually the scope of these legal rights broadened . . . and the term ‘property’ has
grown to comprise every form of possession—intangible, as well as tangible.”).
6

24 C.F.R. § 164.303 (1996).

7

Austin Rutherford, Byrne: Closing the Gap Between HIPAA and Patient Privacy, 53 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 201, 202 (2016).
8

Id.

9

Id.
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care in negligence cases. 10 Other states have enacted legislation to regulate the
“privacy, confidentiality, security, use, and disclosure of information.” 11
Despite these preliminary steps, the primary focus has been on private data
breaches, leaving breaches in the U.S. public sector without “the attention [they]
deserve[].” 12 Like hospitals, doctors’ offices, and pharmacies, the government holds
large volumes of sensitive data. 13 Unlike privately held data, however, the government
obtains this information through “coercive or unbargained-for” means.”14
Specifically, they obtain it through either: (1) requiring disclosures by law “(e.g. tax
returns, the census, law enforcement);” or (2) “in connection with an activity for which
there is no realistic alternative source or supplier (e.g. licensing or benefits).” 15 A
number of states have employed the former method to require medical facilities to
disclose personal health information when it furthers a state interest. 16 For example,
Georgia—in response to the current opioid epidemic—passed House Bill 249 in 2017,
requiring prescribers to enter patients’ prescription information for Schedule II, III,
IV, and V controlled substances in a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program
(PDMP). 17 The PDMP, which falls under the purview of the Georgia Department of
Public Health, gives providers the ability to review patients’ history of filled
prescriptions over the last two years. 18
But what if the PDMP gets hacked? Or what if a Department of Public Health
employee leaves his work laptop on the bus? The individuals who were prescribed
certain controlled substances would have their private data in the public domain. They
would “suffer torment, anxiety, and financial and emotional stress wondering if and
when this information will be used against them.”19 Hackers may even be able to “open
credit cards, take out loans, [or] fraudulently obtain tax returns.” 20 Yet, these patients
can’t sue under HIPAA. Moreover, they likely cannot sue under state law as state and
10

See, e.g., Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d 32, 42 (Conn.
2014) (“HIPAA regulations may well inform the applicable standard of care in certain
circumstances.”).
Jean O’Connor & Gene Matthews, Informational Privacy, Public Health, and State Laws,
101 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH (Oct. 2011).
11

12

A. Michael Froomkin, Government Data Breaches, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1019, 1020
(June 2009).
13

Id. at 1022 (“Governments hold a wide variety of data.”).

14

Id. at 1019–20.

15

Id. at 1025.

16

WILLIAM H. ROACH JR., MEDICAL RECORDS AND THE L AW 131 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing
state statutes requiring disclosure of patient health information dealing with controlled drug
prescriptions and occupational diseases); see, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS CH. 94C § 9(d) (1993).
J. Patrick O’Neil, Important Message from the Commissioner, GA. DEP’T OF PUBLIC
HEALTH (Oct. 18, 2017), https://dph.georgia.gov/sites/dph.georgia.gov/files/related_files/
document/DrONeal_PDMP_Deadline_Letter.pdf.
17

Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, GA. DEPT’ OF PUBLIC HEALTH (Aug. 23, 2018),
https://dph.georgia.gov/pdmp.
18

19

Rutherford, supra note 7, at 202.

20

Id.
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federal governments enjoy sovereign immunity. 21 The government is shielded from
liability, unless and until state or federal legislatures abrogate that immunity for state
privacy claims.22 Fortunately for these individuals, however, this immunity does not
protect the government from all claims. 23 An individual whose information has been
improperly acquired or disseminated by a governmental actor may still look to two
sources for agency liability: the Federal Privacy Act 24 or the Constitution. 25 Due to the
shortcomings of the Privacy Act and the Supreme Court’s “restrict[ion] on the ability
of individuals to recover damages for a violation of the Act,” 26 this Article primarily
focuses on the constitutional right to informational privacy. 27
While the Constitution does not explicitly provide a right to privacy, 28 a number
of Supreme Court decisions have recognized that the right may exist. 29 In an attempt
to clarify its scope, the Court in Whalen v. Roe declared that there are two types of
privacy interests: “security of personal information and autonomy in making
important decisions.”30 Although the Supreme Court has confronted decisional
privacy many times, 31 the contours of the right to informational privacy continue to

21

Froomkin, supra note 12, at 1028.

22

See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) ("The immunity from suit belonging to
a State, which is respected and protected by the Constitution within the limits of the judicial
power of the United States, is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure.”).
23

Id.

5 U.S.C. § 552a (2016). The Privacy Act is “the most ambitious piece of federal legislation
in the domain of informational privacy,” and “the most comprehensive law that regulates the
processing and dissemination of information that the government collects about individuals.”
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2024 (2010).
24

25

Caleb Seeley, Once More Unto the Breach: The Constitutional Right to Informational
Privacy and the Privacy Act, N.Y.U. L. REV. 1335, 1358 (Nov. 2016).
Id. at 1358 (“[T]he Court’s narrow interpretation of ‘actual damages’ in the Privacy Act in
FAA v. Cooper restricted the ability of individuals to recover damages for a violation of the
Act.”).
26

Helen L. Gilbert, Minors’ Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1374, 1375 (2007).
27

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (“The Constitution does not explicitly mention any
right of privacy.”); Seeley, supra note 25, at 1359 (“The Constitution does not explicitly
mention a right to privacy.”)
28

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (recognizing a fundamental “right to be
free . . . from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 8–9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment “protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion.”);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965) (Goldberg, J. concurring); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
29

30
31

Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977); see also Gilbert, supra note 27, at 1375.

See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (2007) (addressing decisional privacy
with contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (addressing decisional privacy
with marriage); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (addressing decisional
privacy with family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942)
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elude courts. 32 In fact, the Supreme Court has yet to expressly extend the right to
privacy to informational privacy despite confronting the issue twice since Whalen.33
Despite the Court’s restraint to rule on the existence of the right, every circuit court
with the exception of the D.C. Circuit 34 has interpreted Whalen as establishing such a
right to informational privacy. 35 Although these courts unanimously refuse to extend
the right absolutely, each court varies as to what medical information it protects. 36
The following Article discusses the extent to which the constitutional right to
informational privacy protects medical data from improper acquisition or
dissemination by state agents. 37 Part I provides background on Whalen v. Roe, the
Supreme Court case that has been understood to establish the right to informational
privacy.38 Part I also discusses the variations across the circuit courts as to what
(addressing decisional privacy with procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925) (addressing decisional privacy with child rearing).
32

Gilbert, supra note 27, at 1375.

NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011) (“We assume, without deciding, that the
Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort mentioned in Whalen [v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589
(1977)] and Nixon [v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977)].”); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (referring to a constitutional “interest in avoiding disclosure.”);
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605 (recognizing that in some circumstances, the duty to avoid unwarranted
disclosures of private data “arguably has its roots in the Constitution.”); Christopher R. Smith,
Somebody’s Watching Me: Protecting Patient Privacy in Prescription Health Information, 36
VT. L. REV. 951, 953 (2012) (“Whalen was the Supreme Court’s last examination of the
constitutional right to privacy within the context of PHI, and it left unanswered thee question of
whether or not patients have a right to privacy in . . . PHI.”); Gilbert, supra note 27, at 1375.
33

34

American Federation of Govt. Employees v. HUD, 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]here exists in the United States
Constitution a right to privacy protecting “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters”); Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 72 F.3d 1133, 1138 (3d
Cir. 1995) (“The district court, therefore, committed no error in its holding that there is a
constitutional right to privacy in one’s prescription records.”); Doe v. City of New York, 15
F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[w]e therefore hold that Doe possesses a constitutional right to
confidentiality under Whalen in his HIV status.”); see also ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE
KENNEDY (SMALL CAPS?), THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 142 (1995) (“The Supreme Court has not
addressed the issue again, but following Whalen, a number of lower federal courts recognized
a privacy interest in confidential medical information, including medical records. They also
began to fashion a framework by which to balance an individual’s privacy rights against the
government’s need for access to and disclosure of some personal information.”); Seeley,
supra note 25, at 935, 1365 (“Nine circuits recognize a constitutional right to privacy in
personal information, health or otherwise.”).
35

36

Matson v. Bd. of Educ. Of City Sch. Dist. Of N.Y., 631 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming
trial court’s finding that teacher did not enjoy constitutionally-protected privacy right as to her
fibromyalgia); SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1138 (“While individuals have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in their prescription purchase of controlled substances, such right must be weighed
against the state’s interest in monitoring the use of dangerously addictive drugs”); Smith, supra
note 33, at 953 (noting that “the question of the scope of the constitutional right to privacy in
one’s medical information is largely unresolved”).
37

Smith, supra note 33, at 953.

38

See infra Part I.
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medical information is afforded protection by the right. 39 Part II analyzes the wellestablished approaches adopted by the Second and Third Circuits as they present
opposing interpretations of Whalen, one wholly protecting medical information and
the other protecting scarcely any. 40 Finally, Part III explains why the Supreme Court
and courts that have yet to adopt a uniform approach should follow the Third Circuit
and constitutionally protect all medical information from improper government
acquisition or dissemination. 41 Part III also argues for an amendment to the Privacy
Act to provide individuals whose medical conditions are not afforded protection under
the Constitution an alternative remedy. 42
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL
PRIVACY

In 1977, the Supreme Court arguably recognized a constitutional right to
informational privacy, though it refused to expand its holding beyond the facts of the
case. 43 In Whalen v. Roe, the state of New York responded to the concern that drugs
were being diverted into unlawful channels by enacting a statute that required doctors
to disclose to the state information regarding patients being prescribed certain drugs
with a high potential for abuse.44 These disclosures would include information such as
the patient’s name, address, and age.45 In its opinion, the majority delineated two kinds
of privacy interests: the “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” and “the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.” 46 The
privacy interest dealing with the nondisclosure of medical records falls within the first
category. 47 Ultimately, the Court held that the patient-identification requirement in the
New York statute was insufficient to “constitute an invasion of any right or liberty
protected by the [Constitution].”48 It reasoned that the requirement was furthering a
39

See infra Part I.

40

See infra Part II.

41

See infra Part III.

42

See infra Part III.

Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1977) (recognizing in “some circumstances” the
duty to avoid “unwarranted disclosures” of personal information in computerized data banks
or government files “arguably has its roots in the Constitution”).
43

44

Id. at 589.

45

Id.

46

Id. at 599–600; see also United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d
Cir. 1980) (“[W]e know that [the constitutional protection of the right to privacy] extends to
two types of privacy interests” and “[t]he privacy interest asserted in [medical records] case[s]
falls within the first category referred to in Whalen, the right not to have an individual’s
private affairs made public by the government.”).
Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577 (“The privacy interest asserted in this case [privacy in medical
records] falls within the first category referred to in Whalen v. Roe, the right not to have an
individual's private affairs made public by the government.”).
47

48

Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04; see also ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 35 at 141–42
(“Although the New York law was upheld, Whalen was considered a milestone in the fight for
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legitimate state interest and that disclosure of medical information can be “an essential
part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably on
the character of the patient.” 49
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan argued that despite the majority’s
holding, future technological developments would ultimately require additional
restrictions as such developments may vastly increase the potential for abuse of easily
accessible computerized information. 50 Forty years and countless technological
advances later, 51 the scope of constitutional restrictions on informational privacy
remains unclear. 52 Circuit and district courts interpreting Whalen unanimously permit
acquisition and disclosure of medical information when the government’s interest in
propagating the information outweighs the individual’s interest in keeping the
information private.53 However, most courts do not even reach this balancing test if
they determine the information is not of a constitutionally protected dimension. 54 This
conclusion begs the question: what medical information is constitutionally protected?
The Second Circuit extends the constitutional right to privacy to serious, fatal
conditions and profound psychiatric conditions that impart on their victims

privacy. The recognition of a constitutionally protected interest in certain personal information
was important, as was the recognition of the vulnerability of information in the electronic
era.”).
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602 (“disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital
personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health agencies”); see also MCCLELLAN,
supra note 4, at 162 (“Hippocrates’ ‘holy secrets,’ traditionally guarded by doctor and patient,
are now often noised about and with some peculiar results. The medical examination room is
getting crowded. You think you are talking to your doctor, but insurance companies, lawyers,
future educators or employers, researchers—even credit bureaus—may be listening in.”).
49

Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04 (Brennan, J. concurring) (“What is more troubling about this
scheme, however, is the central computer storage of the data thus collected.”).
50

51

Jim Atherton, Development of the Electronic Health Record, 13 AMA J. OF ETHICS 186, 188
(“Since the 1980s, more concerted efforts have been made to increase use of EHR.”).
See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (“Although the full measure of the constitutional
protection of the right to privacy has not yet been delineated . . . ”); Philip Kurland, The
Private I, THE UNIV. OF CHICAGO MAG. 7, 8 (1976) (“The concept of a constitutional right of
privacy still remains largely undefined.”).
52

SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1138 (“As with many individual rights, the right of privacy in one’s
prescription drug records must be balanced against important competing interests.”); Doe, 15
F.3d at 269 (“[T]he city’s interest in disseminating information concerning conciliation
agreements must be ‘substantial’ and must be balanced against Doe’s right to
confidentiality.”); Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (“In recognition that the right of an
individual to control access to her or his medical history is not absolute, courts and
legislatures have determined that public health or other public concerns may support access to
facts an individual might otherwise choose to withhold.”).
53

Lee v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 636 F.3d 245, 260 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Only after a
fundamental right is identified should the court proceed to the next step of the analysis—the
balancing of the government’s interest in disseminating the information against the
individual’s interest in keeping the information private.”); Ortlieb v. Howery, 74 F. App’x
853, 857 (10th Cir. 2003) (refusing to consider whether the government’s interest outweighed
the plaintiff’s right to privacy where plaintiff had no right to privacy in her x-rays).
54

8
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“discrimination and intolerance.” 55 In Doe v. City of New York, the court found that
individuals infected with HIV “clearly possess[] a constitutional right to privacy
regarding their condition” given its seriousness and fatality. 56 The court further
reasoned that an individual’s revelation that he has HIV “potentially exposes [him]
not to understanding or compassion but to discrimination and intolerance, further
necessitating the extension of the right to confidentiality.” 57
Based on the reasoning laid out in Doe, the Second Circuit extended the
constitutional right to privacy to transsexualism in Powell v. Schriver.58 The court
focused on transsexualism’s “excruciatingly private and intimate nature,” its status as
a “profound psychiatric disorder,” and its vulnerability to discrimination and
intolerance. 59 However, in Matson v. Board of Education Of City School Dist. of New
York, the Second Circuit declined to extend the right it so established in Doe and
Powell to patients with fibromyalgia.60 The Court reasoned that fibromyalgia, however
serious, is neither fatal nor a profound psychiatric disorder. 61
The Third Circuit protects “those [rights of privacy] which are ‘fundamental’ or
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” 62 In United States v. Westinghouse
Electric Corporation, the court held that medical records containing “results of routine
testing, such as X-rays, blood tests, pulmonary function tests, [and] hearing and visual
tests” are unquestionably “well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy
protection.” 63 The court again protected medical records, specifically records of
prescription medications, in Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority (SEPTA).64 Thus, despite imposing what may seem a fairly stringent
Matson, 631 F.2d at 65–69 (emphasis omitted) (finding that “although fibromyalgia is a
serious medical condition, it does not carry with it the sort of opprobrium that confers upon
those who suffer from it a constitutional right of privacy as to that medical condition); Powell,
175 F.3d at 111 (concluding the reasoning in Doe “compels the conclusion that the
Constitution does indeed protect the right to maintain the confidentiality of one’s
transsexualism”); Doe, 15 F.3d at 267 (finding plaintiff possessed a confidential right to
confidentiality under Whalen in his HIV status).
55

56

Doe, 15 F.3d at 266.

57

Id. at 267; see also JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND
THE R ISE OF TECHNOLOGY 130 (1997) (“Disclosure of [medical] information . . . can be not
only embarrassing but can lead to discrimination, loss of employment, and financial loss.”).
Powell, 175 F.3d at 112 (Like the HIV status discussed in Doe, “transsexualism is the
unusual condition that is likely to provoke both an intense desire to preserve one’s medical
confidentiality, as well as hostility and intolerance from others.”).
58

59

Powell, 175 F.3d at 111.

Matson, 631 F.2d at 64–65 (explaining that “[a] general medical determination or
acknowledgment that a disease is serious does not give rise ipso facto to a constitutionallyprotected privacy right”).
60

Id. (noting that despite being characterized by “fatigue and muscular soreness and
tenderness”, fibromyalgia is only debilitating in certain instances).
61

62

SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1137 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)).

63

Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577.

64

SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1140.
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standard, requiring the plaintiff’s right to nondisclosure of her information be
“fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of liberty,” the Third Circuit seems to
broadly consider the nondisclosure of all medical information to be of such a
fundamental nature to warrant its protection.
With arguably the narrowest interpretation of Whalen, the Sixth Circuit
“developed and applied a different approach to assessing information privacy claims”
than its sister circuits. 65 The court, like the Third Circuit, only extends a right to
privacy to interests that can be deemed “fundamental or implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.”66 However unlike the Third Circuit, the Sixth Circuit is yet to
“confront[] circumstances involving the disclosure of medical records” that are
“tantamount to the breach of a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ under the Constitution.” 67
Instead it has ruled that the disclosure of medical records,68 DNA profiles,69
psychotherapy records,70 and one’s status as HIV positive71 do not rise to the level of
a breach of a right recognized as fundamental under the Constitution. The Sixth Circuit
has only recognized constitutionally protected informational-privacy interest twice:
(1) where the release of personal information could lead to bodily harm; 72 and (2)
where the information released was of a sexual, personal, and humiliating nature. 73

65

Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 442 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Lee, 636 F.3d at 261
(“This court, in contrast to some of our sister circuits, ‘has narrowly construed the holdings of
Whalen and Nixon to extend the right to information privacy only to interests that implicate a
fundamental liberty interest.’”); Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d
566, 574 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Since DeSanti, this Court has not strayed from its holding, and
continues to evaluate privacy claims based on whether the interest sought to be protected is a
fundamental interest or an interest implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”).
66

Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 683 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080,
1090 (6th Cir. 1981).
67

Lee, 636 F.3d at 261.

Summe v. Kenton Cnty. Clerk’s Office, 604 F.3d 257, 270–71 (6th Cir. 2010); Jarvis v.
Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1995) (prison officials’ disclosure of rape victim’s
medical records to an inmate “does not rise to the level of a breach of a right recognized as
‘fundamental’ under the Constitution”); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Dir. of Nat’l Inst. For
Occupational Safety and Health, 636 F.2d 163, 165–66 (6th Cir. 1980) (enforcing a subpoena
for the production of employees’ medical records finding no intrusion upon protected privacy
interests).
68

69

Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 428–29 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding plaintiff did not have a
fundamental privacy interest in information contained in his DNA profile).
70

In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 641 (6th Cir. 1983) (affirming enforcement of a subpoena
issued by a grand jury, commanding psychotherapists to produce patient information).
71

Doe v. Lockwood, No. 95-3499, 1996 WL 367046, at *6 (6th Cir. June 27, 1996); Doe v.
Wiggington, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994).
72

Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1069–70 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that
disclosure of officers’ personal information placed them and their families at substantial risk of
serious bodily harm and thus encroached upon their “fundamental rights to privacy and personal
security under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
73

Bloch, 156 F.3d at 683 (concluding that rape victims have a fundamental right of privacy as
to the intimate details of their rapes reasoning “such basic matters as contraception, abortion,
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Thus, despite using the exact same test—or perhaps more appropriately, the exact
same verbiage of a test—to determine whether information is constitutionally
protected, the Sixth and Third Circuits have vastly different interpretations of what is
“fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” 74
The Tenth Circuit protects information when “the party asserting the right has a
legitimate expectation of privacy” in the information. 75 In considering whether
someone’s expectation of privacy in a medical condition is reasonable, the court
examines the personal nature of the condition and only extends protection to highly
personal or sensitive data.76 Under this approach, the Tenth Circuit has extended the
right to privacy to HIV, 77 prescription drug records, 78 and medical records.79 However,
it has refused to protect X-rays, reasoning that they contain no information of a
sensitive or intimate nature about which an individual could form a legitimate
expectation of privacy; it is plainly obvious when someone has a broken limb to
anyone who witnessed the accident or sees her cast.80 Thus, while Tenth Circuit
decisions claim to protect only information of the utmost sensitive nature, in practice,
the Tenth Circuit considers most medical information sensitive and thus private
enough to warrant protection. 81 The only information the Tenth Circuit appears to
marriage, and family life are protected by the constitution from unwarranted government
intrusion.”).
SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1138 (“When the underlying claim is one of invasion of privacy, the
complaint must be ‘limited to those [rights of privacy] which are “fundamental” or “implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.”’”) (quoting Davis, 424 U.S. at 713); Lee, 636 F.3d at 260
(“A plaintiff alleging a violation of her right to informational privacy must therefore
demonstrate ‘that the interest at take relates to “those personal rights that can be deemed
fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”’”) (quoting DeSanti, 653 F.2d at
1090).
74

Ortlieb, 74 F. App’x at 856; see also Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986)
(“The Due Process Clause directly protects fundamental aspects of personal privacy against
intrusion by the State. One aspect of this substantive due process arises from the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. Due process thus implies an assurance of
confidentiality with respect to certain forms of personal information possessed by the state.”).
75

Ortlieb, 74 Fed. App’x at 857 (citing Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1570 (10th Cir.
1989)) (“[To] determin[e] whether information . . . is of such a highly personal or sensitive
nature that it falls within the zone of confidentiality . . . the court must consider, (1) if the
party asserting the right has a legitimate expectation of privacy, (2) if disclosure serves a
compelling state interest, and (3) if disclosure can be made in the least intrusive manner.”).
76

A.L.A. v. West Valley City, 26 F.3d 989, 990 (10th Cir. 1994) (“There is no dispute that
confidential medical information is entitled to constitutional privacy.”).
77

78

Douglas v. Dobbs, 419 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005) (establishing that plaintiff had a
constitutional right to privacy in her prescription drug records as an individual using
prescription drugs has a reasonable expectation of such information remaining private).
Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 479-80 (10th Cir. 1994) (There is “no question
that an employee’s medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are
well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection.”).
79

Ortlieb, 74 Fed. App’x at 857 (“[T]here was nothing confidential about the fact that Ms.
Ortlieb had a severely broken leg.”).
80

81

Lankford, 27 F.3d at 479–80.
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exclude from constitutional protection are those conditions discernable to the naked
eye.82
This brief overview of the relevant case law evinces the inconsistency with which
the circuit courts extend the constitutional right to informational privacy in the
healthcare arena. Medical records, for example, are “well within the ambit of materials
entitled privacy protection” in the Third 83 and the Tenth Circuits, 84 whereas the Sixth
Circuit refuses to categorically protect them. 85 Routine testing and X-rays are similarly
protected in the Third Circuit 86 but not in the Tenth Circuit. 87 An individual’s HIV
status is constitutionally protected in the Second and Third Circuits but not in the Sixth
Circuit.88 With such sharp divergence in the circuit courts’ interpretations of what
information is constitutionally protected under Whalen, individuals seeking to prevent
disclosure of the same medical condition face conflicting outcomes entirely depending
on where they live.
II.

TO PROTECT OR NOT TO PROTECT: THE SECOND CIRCUIT VS. THE THIRD
CIRCUIT

Until the Supreme Court adopts a uniform approach, courts with little to no
precedent must look to those courts that have sufficiently addressed the issue of
informational privacy for guidance. 89 This analysis focuses on the approaches adopted
by the Second and Third Circuits as these courts present robust case law and opposing
views on what medical information is protected under the Constitution.

82

Ortlieb, 74 Fed. App’x at 857.

83

Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.

Lankford, 27 F.3d at 479-80 (There is “no question that an employee’s medical records,
which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials
entitled to privacy protection.”).
84

85

Lee, 636 F.3d at 261.

86

Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.

Ortlieb, 74 Fed. App’x at 857 (finding x-rays were not intimate or personal enough for the
plaintiff to possibly “form a legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy”).
87

SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1138; Doe, 15 F.2d at 267 (“We therefore hold that Doe possesses a
constitutional right to confidentiality under Whalen in his HIV status”); but see Wiggington,
21 F.3d at 740 (finding inmate possessed no constitutionally right to privacy in his HIV
status).
88

89

Paul Nordeman, The Vanishing Right to Privacy: A Critique of the Second Circuit’s
Approach to Medical Confidentiality in Matson v. Board of Education, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 225, 234 (2011) (“As courts continue to confront matters implicating individuals’
privacy rights about personal medical information, they will look to previous decisions for
guidance.”).
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A. The Second Circuit’s Limited Protection Approach
The Second Circuit imposes one of the most stringent standards of the circuit
courts and only extends the right to privacy to serious, fatal medical conditions and
profound psychiatric disorders. It additionally requires that the condition “bring about
public opprobrium.” 90 Thus, in considering whether a constitutional right to privacy
attaches to various medical conditions, the Second Circuit proceeds on a case-by-case
basis that will “necessarily include certain medical conditions [and] exclude others.” 91
Under this approach, the Second Circuit has extended the right to privacy to HIV, 92
transsexualism, 93 and a person’s psychiatric health and substance-abuse history. 94 A
district court has also extended the right to privacy to sickle cell anemia. 95 Other courts
in the Second Circuit have refused, however, to extend the right to less serious
conditions. 96 This bar, higher than those imposed by the Third and Tenth Circuits,
forces plaintiffs to prove their ailment is of such an embarrassing and serious degree
in order to receive constitutional protection. 97 While this threshold may disincentive
plaintiffs from bringing claims to redress the disclosure of less significant conditions,
it imposes a number of difficulties in terms of its enforcement.

Id. at 66; Nordeman, supra note 89, at 234 (“The Matson Court . . . considered both the
seriousness of Dorrit Matson’s condition and the amount of discrimination she was likely to
face because of her fibromyalgia.”); see DeVries, supra note 3, at 302 (“Having the world
learn about one’s Prozac prescription can be embarrassing; having the world learn about one’s
HIV-positive status can be life-shattering.”).
90

91

Matson, 631 F.3d at 67.

92

Doe, 15 F.3d at 267.

Powell, 175 F.3d at 111; Nordeman, supra notes 89, at 231 (“The Second Circuit had
previously given that designation only to HIV and transsexualism.”).
93

O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Medical information in
general, and information about a person’s psychiatric health and substance-abuse history in
particular, is information of the most intimate kind.”).
94

95

Fleming v. State Univ. of N.Y., 502 F. Supp. 2d 324, 342-45 (2d. Cir. 2007); Nordeman,
supra notes 89, at 231.
96

Matson, 631 F.3d at 67 (refusing to extend the right of privacy to fibromyalgia); Watson v.
Wright, 08-CV-62, 2010 WL 55932, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2010) (“This [c]ourt finds no basis
in Powell and its progeny for holding that, in a prison setting, plaintiff's Hepatitis C condition
is the type of condition that gives rise to constitutional protection under Powell.”); Rush v.
Artuz, No. 00 Civ. 3436, 2004 WL 1770064, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2004) (“First, plaintiff's
wrist injury and his stomach problems cannot be classified as ‘personal matters of a sensitive
nature’ and second, due to his use of a splint, plaintiff's wrist injury was clearly visible to all
those around him.”).
97

Matson, 631 F.3d at 67 (denying constitutional protection to a disease the court did not
believe to be serious enough of subject to any intolerance or discrimination).
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1. “Serious” and “Embarrassing” are Ambiguous Terms
First, “serious” and “embarrassing” are ambiguous. In the Second Circuit, whether
the condition is embarrassing enough to warrant protection is an objective question, is
largely defined by the views of society. 98 If the court does not believe a disease is
attributed to socially repugnant conduct or does not “view[] [the disease] as directly
associated with any disease which might conceivably be characterized as loathsome,”
it will refuse to find a right to privacy in the condition and the plaintiff’s subjective
humiliation would be immaterial. 99 The court in Matson rested its determination that
fibromyalgia lacked this sort of social opprobrium on the wide availability of a drug
therapy and its being regularly advertised alongside other therapies for conditions the
court considered not serious.100 However, the Second Circuit fails to consider the
variations in embarrassment thresholds among individuals and societies. 101 What
constitutes sensitive medical information varies from one person to another, one
religion to another, and one culture to another. 102 Different views may arise “from
individual patients’ sensitivities or embarrassment thresholds” or from differences in
religious or cultural beliefs. 103 Thus, whether the Second Circuit finds medical
information constitutionally protected effectively hinges on who is on the jury and in
what town they live.
Whether a condition is serious is likewise unclear.104 This confusion is evidenced
by the Second Circuit’s own inability to develop a consistent definition of “serious.”
In Doe, the court held that the need for constitutional protection, while near its apex
when a person suffers from HIV, would be recognized for any serious medical
condition.105 In Powell, the Second Circuit similarly found that one’s
transsexualism—like HIV—is a matter “in which the privacy interest is at or near its
‘zenith.’” 106 However, in Matson, the court held that serious, fibromyalgia did not
reach the bar set in Doe and Powell and adopted a stricter approach “based almost

98

Id. at 66.

99

See Golub v. Enquirer/Star Group, Inc., 89 N.Y.2d 1074, 1077 (1997) (holding that cancer
was not societally viewed as “loathsome”).
Matson, 631 F.3d at 67; see also Nordeman, supra notes 89, at 246 (listing “high
cholesterol, frequent urination, osteoporosis, and acid reflux” as conditions with therapies
advertised alongside Lyrica).
100

101

HEIDI TRANBERG & JEM RASHBASS, MEDICAL RECORDS USE AND ABUSE 62 (2014).

102

Id.

103

Id.

Nordeman, supra note 89, at 248 (“The term ‘serious,’ for example, which has already
been shown to invite a number of different interpretations, needs more clarity if it is to be
effectively used.”).
104

Doe, 15 F.2d at 267 (“Clearly, an individual’s choice to inform others that she has
contracted . . . a fatal, incurable disease is one that she should normally be allowed to make
for herself. This would be true for any serious medical condition, but is especially true with
regard to those infected with HIV.”) (emphasis added).
105

106

Matson, 631 F.3d at 67 (Straub, J. dissenting).
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exclusively on factual comparisons of fibromyalgia to HIV and transsexualism.” 107
The Second Circuit reasoned that fibromyalgia was debilitating only in certain
instances and was neither fatal like the condition in Doe nor profoundly psychiatric
like the one in Powell.108 In one ruling, the Second Circuit transformed its zenith of
seriousness to a threshold. 109
Other definitions of “serious” as related to medical conditions similarly add to the
confusion. The Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) defines a serious health
condition as “an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that
involves: (A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility;
or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider.” 110 The Department of Labor
has promulgated regulations similarly defining “serious health conditions requiring
continuing treatment.” 111 The Committee on Serious and Complex Medical
Conditions published a list of criteria to be used to determine whether a medical
condition is serious and complex, including: conditions that are life threatening, cause
significant pain or discomfort, require frequent monitoring, or affect multiple organ
systems. 112 While both the FMLA and Committee on Serious and Complex Medical
Conditions either expressly consider or have been interpreted to consider conditions
such as asthma and arthritis to be serious, 113 those suffering from either would unlikely
be afforded protection in the Second Circuit as neither condition is fatal like HIV nor
profoundly psychiatric like transsexualism. 114

Id. (“Fibromyalgia, however serious, is neither alleged to be fatal, as we recognized the
HIV condition to be in Doe nor is it a ‘profound psychiatric disorder’ as we noted in Powell);
see Nordeman, supra notes 89, at 234 (“Despite having already admitted the serious nature of
fibromyalgia, the court paradoxically devoted the bulk of its opinion to undermining the
seriousness of the disease.”).
107

Matson, 631 F.3d at 65; see also Nordeman, supra note 89, at 234 (“[T]he majority
compounded much of the dicta from Doe and Powell into a set of requirements that could only
be met by conditions matching the severity, both physical and mental, of HIV and
transsexualism.”).
108

109

Matson, 631 F.3d at 65.

110

29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2009); FMLA: Serious Health Condition: How do I know if an
Employee’s Medical Absence Qualifies for FMLA Leave? What is Considered a Serious
Health Condition?, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (Feb. 16, 2016),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/toolsandsamples/hrqa/pages/howemployeemedicalab
sencequalifiesforfmlaleave.aspx (listing examples including chronic conditions that require
periodic visits to a provider, incapacity for pregnancy or prenatal care, permanent or long-term
conditions, Alzheimer’s, cancer, severe arthritis, and strokes).
111

29 C.F.R. § 825.115 (2013).

112

CAROLE A. CHRAVALA & STEVEN SHARFSTEIN, DEFINITION OF SERIOUS AND COMPLEX
MEDICAL CONDITIONS 19 (1999).
113

29 C.F.R. § 825.115 (2013); CHRAVALA & SHARFSTEIN, supra note 112, at 19.

Matson, 631 F.3d at 67 (“Fibromyalgia, however serious, is neither alleged to be fatal, as
we recognized the HIV condition to be in Doe nor is it a ‘profound psychiatric disorder’ as we
noted in Powell).
114
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2. “Serious” and “Embarrassing” are Subject to Evolve
To make matters even more complicated, a serious condition “may be serious and
complex for some patients at some points during the course of their disease or
disability” but not at all times or forever. 115 An ailment that at one point was severe in
nature and surely fatal may over time become quite curable with enough research and
funding.116 And, as medical conditions become more curable with more widely
available drug therapies, advertisements for such drug therapies may appear alongside
those for conditions the court had previously considered not serious. 117 With enough
treatment and enough advertising, over time the loathsome and negative stigmas
surrounding these conditions may disappear altogether. 118 Thus, while the Second
Circuit has limited precedent guiding their decisions as to what conditions are
“serious” or “embarrassing,” advances in medicine and technology will inevitably
make this precedent unreliable and in constant flux.
3. Jurors and Judges are Not Equipped to Determine the Seriousness of a Condition
Finally, without a more precise definition of serious or factors to guide such a
determination, the Second Circuit is relying on jurors and judges, likely with little to
no medical background, to determine on a case-by-case basis whether an individual’s
condition is serious.119 While the Supreme Court has made it clear that judges have a
duty to serve as evidentiary gatekeepers with respect to scientific evidence, this duty
does not come without support. 120 Rather, judges are guided by a clear list of factors—
known as the Daubert factors—to help them determine the evidence’s reliability and
ultimate admissibility. 121 Thus, if judges have a duty to serve as gatekeepers tasked
115

CHRAVALA & SHARFSTEIN, supra note 112, at 19.

116

See Hasina Samji, et al., Closing the Gap: Increases in Life Expectancy among Treated
HIV-Positive Individuals in the United States and Canada, 8 PLOS ONE e81355 (Dec. 18,
2013).
Erica Kaufman West, The Problem with “Not an Actual Patient,” OUTWARD (Jan. 7,
2016),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2016/01/07/_not_an_actual_patient_how_hiv_drug_ads_
reinforce_aids_stigma.html.
117

118

Robert Preidt, Life Expectancy with HIV Nears Normal with Treatment, CBS NEWS (May
11, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/life-expectancy-with-hiv-nears-normal-withtreatment.
See Nordeman, supra note 89, at 241 (noting that whether the condition was serious is “left
to the imagination of judges” in the Second Circuit).
119

120

See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993); Stephen
Breyer, Science in the Courtroom, 4 ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECH. (2000), http://issues.org/164/breyer/.
121

Daubert establishes the Daubert Standard, under which the factors that may be considered
in determining whether an expert’s methodology is valid are: “(1) whether the theory or
technique in question can be and has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer
review and publication; (3) its known or potential error rate; (4) the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling its operation; and (5) whether it has attracted widespread
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with determining whether conditions fall within a category of information protected
by the Constitution, they should have more than the word “serious” to guide them. 122
Consider a hypothetical individual who has recently been diagnosed with diabetes.
She is terrified of needles and knows several people who have succumbed to the
disease. She is struggling to cope with her changed circumstances. Now consider an
individual who has had diabetes his whole life. He thinks little of his condition, and
quite frankly, has not known life without it. Now imagine that these two individuals
are judges sitting on different courts. The first judge may consider diabetes quite
serious.123 The second, however, would surely not find that his diabetes rises to the
level of a constitutionally protected ailment established by Second Circuit
precedent.124 To allow judges or jurors to determine whether a condition is serious,
without any definition or guidance beyond precedent limited to very few specific
conditions, is to allow medically untrained triers of fact to rely on their own
experiences or biases to determine whether an individual has a constitutionally
protected condition.
B. The Third Circuit’s More Liberal Approach
The Third Circuit protects information when a claimant asserts a violation of a
right to privacy which is fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 125
This verbiage, taken from the landmark personal privacy case Roe v. Wade, has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court to include rights relating to marriage, 126
procreation, 127 contraception, 128 family relationships,129 and child rearing.130 Thus far,
the Third Circuit has considered all medical records and the information therein

acceptance within a relevant scientific community.” Daubert Standard, LEGAL INFORMATION
INSTITUTE : CORNELL L AW SCHOOL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/daubert_standard;
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
Nordeman, supra notes 89, at 241 (“A more definitive rule would be created if the word
‘serious’ were simply replaced with a definition.”).
122

123

See, e.g., Support Community, AM. D IABETES ASSOC. (Dec. 20, 2016),
https://community.diabetes.org/discuss/viewtopic/1/11097?post_id=118184 (“[I’m] new to
this whole diabetes thing and [I’m] scared to death.”).
See, e.g., Bridget Montgomery, Quite Playing the Victim: Why Your Diabetes Shouldn’t
Define You, THEDIABETESCOUNCIL (Sept. 4, 2018) (“You just happen to be someone with
diabetes, you are not diabetes.”).
124

125

SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1137 (citing Davis, 424 U.S. at 713).

126

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).

127

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942).

128

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (2007).

129

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).

130

Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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likewise to fall within this scope. 131 Consequently, the circuit has extended the right
to informational privacy to medical records, 132 routine testing, X-rays, blood tests,
pulmonary function tests, hearing and visual tests, 133 prescription records,134
pregnancy status, 135 and one’s HIV-positive status.136 This bar, arguably nonexistent
and quite obviously lower than the one imposed by the Second Circuit, seems to have
been set by the court in Westinghouse and followed in subsequent cases ever since. 137
While facially overbroad, the Third Circuit still considers the “type of the record
requested, the information it does or might contain, [and] the potential for harm in any
subsequent nonconsensual disclosure” when determining whether the state’s interest
in the information outweighs the individual’s interest in nondisclosure. 138
1.

Medical Information is Generally Afforded Greater Protection

The court in Westinghouse reasoned that medical records are afforded greater
protection than other materials in American jurisprudence. 139 For example, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure “impose a higher burden for discovery of reports of the
physical and mental condition of a party or other person than for discovery
generally.” 140 Under the Freedom of Information Act, medical files are the subject of
Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (“Information about one’s body and state of health is matter
which the individual is ordinarily entitled to retain within ‘the private enclave where he may
lead a private life.’”).
131

132

In re Search Warrant (Sealed), 810 F.2d 67, 71 (3d. Cir. 1987); Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at
577; see also Malleus v. George 641 F.3d 560, 565 (3d. Cir. 2014) (declining to extend the
right to a report investigating improper physical conduct as it did not contain medical
information).
133

Westinghouse., 638 F.2d at 577.

134

SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1137.

Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 302-03 (3d. Cir. 2000) (holding defendant’s disclosure of
plaintiff’s pregnancy status “falls squarely within the contours of the recognized right of one
to be free from disclosure of personal matters . . . but also concerns medical information,
which [the Third Circuit has] previously held is entitled to this very protection.”).
135

136

Doe v. Delie, 257 F.2d 309, 317 (3d Cir. 2001) (granting an inmate a right of privacy in his
HIV-positive status).
See, e.g., Id. at 317 (“We have long recognized the right to privacy in one’s medical
information.”).
137

Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (“The factors which should be considered in deciding
whether an intrusion into an individual's privacy is justified are the type of record requested,
the information it does or might contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent
nonconsensual disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record
was generated, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree of
need for access, and whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy,
or other recognizable public interest militating toward access.”).
138

139
140

Id.

Id. (comparing FED. R. CIV. P. 35 with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)); see also 8 Wright and Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, §§ 2237, 2238 (1970).
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a specific exemption. 141 This difference in treatment “reflects a recognition that
information concerning one’s body has a special character.” 142
Further, one need only look to the myriad of laws protecting medical records 143
and doctor-patient confidentiality144 to understand the importance of privacy regarding
medical information. Yet these laws do not discriminate and afford protection to only
certain conditions; rather, they expressly prohibit disclosure of “any medical
information.” 145 While they typically focus on healthcare organizations’ duty to
maintain confidentiality, 146 the purpose behind these laws should not be ignored when
attempting to discern the extent to which state agents should similarly keep
information private. The laws exist because the professional duty to keep patients’
medical information confidential is a well-established doctrine147 based on the idea
that health information is “among the most private of information.” 148 If all medical
information is protected from disclosure by physicians, permitting disclosure of
certain conditions once disseminated to a state agent would frustrate the intent of these
laws and doctrines.
2.

Private and Sensitive are not Synonymous

Additionally, while other circuit courts only find constitutional protection in more
serious and sensitive information, the Third Circuit draws an important distinction

141

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976).

142

Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577.

EMANUEL HAYT & JONATHAN HAYT, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICAL RECORDS 10 (1964) (“In
many states, the privacy of the [medical] record is protected by a privileged communications
statute.”); see O.C.G.A. § 24-12-12 (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2292 (2003); MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 4-302 (2009).
143

144

While the Federal Rules of Evidence does not recognize doctor-patient confidentiality,
many states have adopted such laws. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2157 (2010);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.235 (1988).
145

O.C.G.A. § 24-12-12 (emphasis added).

146

43 C.F.R. § 164.314 (1996); A GUIDE TO HIPAA SECURITY AND THE LAW 16-17 (Stephen
S. Wu ed., 2007) (“The scope of parties covered by HIPAA may also cause some confusion.
HIPAA covers only health plans and health care clearinghouses, organizations that play
central roles in the processing of claims transactions, as well as health care providers who
transmit any health information in electronic form in connection with one of the standard
HIPAA transactions.”).
147

Rebecca Suarez, Breaching Doctor-Patient Confidentiality: Confusion Among Physicians
About Involuntary Disclosure of Genetic Information, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 491, 493
(2012). The Hippocratic Oath, one of the earliest known sets of doctrines for healthcare
providers, also addresses confidentiality: “Whatever I may see or learn about people in the
course of my work or in my private life which should not be disclosed I will keep to myself and
treat in complete confidence . . . ” TONY HOPE, MEDICAL E THICS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION
90 (2004) (quoting the Hippocratic Oath).
148

DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 177 (2003).
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between private and sensitive information. 149 Medical records, the Third Circuit
opines, are still private and thus constitutionally protected even in the absence of
sensitive information therein. 150 Thus, while the sensitivity of the information will
remain a factor in determining whether the government’s interest outweighs the
individual’s interest in nondisclosure, the Third Circuit removes any hurdle for
plaintiffs to clear by considering all medical conditions ipso facto private and worthy
of constitutional protection. 151
To better illustrate this distinction, consider the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution. 152 Under the Fourth Amendment, individuals have the right to be secure,
in both their persons and property, against unreasonable searches and seizures. 153
Thus, without consent from the individual, the state agent seeking to search a person’s
property must have a legitimate interest; entry into a home without just cause
“constitutes an unjustified, forcible intrusion that violates the Fourth Amendment.”154
There is no hurdle a plaintiff must clear to show that his property is of a sensitive or
important enough caliber in order to be afforded this protection as he is guaranteed
this privacy protection by the Constitution. To hold otherwise would be akin to
permitting a search and seizure of insignificant, unimportant items in one’s home
simply because they are not sensitive and thus not private; citizens would be unable
to fend off unconstitutional searches of their homes if their homes did not ultimately
possess anything of interest.
III.

MEDICAL PRIVACY GOING FORWARD

A. Courts Should Protect All Medical Information
Until the Supreme Court clarifies what information is protected by the
Constitution, courts that have yet to determine what medical information is
constitutionally protected should follow the Third Circuit in Westinghouse and extend
protection to all medical information. Adopting any limitation on what types of
medical information are inherently protected by the Constitution would perpetuate
inconsistencies across the circuit courts and frustrate a number of public interests.

Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (“This material, although private, is not generally regarded
as sensitive.”); see Private, Marriam-Webster (defining private as “intended for or restricted
to the use of a particular person”); but see Sensitive, Marriam-Webster (defining sensitive as
“calling for tact, care, or caution in treatment”).
149

150

Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 579 (extending a right of privacy to medical records despite a
“high degree of sensitivity” therein).
Id. at 577 (“There can be no question that . . . medical records . . . are well within the ambit
of materials entitled to privacy protection.”).
151

152

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

153

Id.

154

Leon-Velazquez v. State, 269 Ga. App. 760, 761 (2004).
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1. Courts Should Incentivize Safeguarding Against Inadvertent Information
Disclosures Rather than Excuse Them
First, interpreting the Constitution as protecting all medical information would
further society’s interest in keeping medical data private. When courts require
plaintiffs to prove their medical condition meets some threshold in order to be
constitutionally protected, necessarily some conditions are protected and others are
not. There are two primary issues with this approach. First, this would allow the
government to acquire any non-constitutionally protected medical information despite
having no need for it. Second, even if a state agent properly acquired the information,
he may inadvertently or recklessly disclose the information and still be immune from
suit if, again, the information did not rise to a level of constitutional protection. In
courts like the Sixth Circuit that hardly protect any medical information, this approach
has led to the blatant publishing of an individual’s HIV status in a local newspaper
with no repercussion for the government agent responsible nor recourse for the
individual whose privacy had been violated. 155
Instead, courts should interpret the Constitution as protecting all medical data to
incentivize safeguarding against improper disclosures. In this day and age, inadvertent
and intentional dissemination of medical information is rampant. 156 With the
expanding use of electronic medical records157 and the pervasiveness of data theft,
breaches, and improper disclosure,158 those in possession of intimate information
should be incentivized to protect it. By effectively excusing the government for
wrongfully disseminating sensitive medical data simply because the information did
not rise to the level of Constitutional protection, the government would have less of
an incentive to implement safeguards to ensure that its agents were keeping records
and the information therein secure.
Relevant case law supports this contention. The court in Whalen relied on the New
York Health Department’s security provisions in the statute and the remote possibility
that the employees would fail to maintain proper security of the information to find
Lockwood, 1996 WL 367046, at *6 (“In fact the first words in the article were John Doe’s
first and last names, and his name appeared numerous times throughout the article.”).
155

156

Jim Avila & Serena Marshall, Your Medical Records May Not be Private: ABC News
Investigation, ABC NEWS (Sept. 13, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/medical-recordsprivate-abc-news-investigation/story?id=17228986 (“Many of the breaches occur through
theft or hacking of a computer that contains medical records, loss of the records or unknown
reasons.”).
157

Richard F. Gillum, From Papyrus to the Electronic Tablet: A Brief History of the Clinical
Medical Record with Lessons for the Digital Age, 126 AM. J. MED. 853, 856 (Oct. 2013)
(noting over 50% of physicians reported using electronic medical records in 2011).
158

Suanu Bliss Wikina, What Caused the Breach? An Examination of Use of Information
Technology and Heatlh Data Breaches, PERSPECTIVES IN HEALTH INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT (Oct. 1, 2014) (“Data breaches arising from theft, loss, unauthorized
access/disclosure, improper disclosure, or hacking incidents involving personal health
information continue to increase every year.”); Nicolas Terry, Health Privacy is Difficult but
Not Impossible in a Post-HIPAA Data-Driven World, 146 CHEST 835, 836 (“Medical data
theft has been steadily increasing, with the health-care sector becoming the leading target for
cyberattacks in 2013.”).
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that no invasion of a constitutional right to privacy had occurred. 159 Additionally, the
court in Westinghouse considered what safeguards the state had implemented to
protect the data in its seven-part balancing test to determine whether the government’s
interest in the protected information outweighed the individual’s interest in
nondisclosure. 160 Thus, in order to even first acquire the information, the government
agency in Westinghouse needed to prove that its “procedures of safekeeping the
records . . . represent[ed] sufficiently adequate assurance of non-disclosure.”161
Federal laws additionally support the idea of safeguarding medical information.162
When thinking about patient privacy, one of the laws that generally first comes to
mind is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 163 HIPAA
requires all covered entities—any healthcare providers, healthcare clearinghouses,
health plans, and insurers—to ensure the confidentiality of protected health
information (PHI). 164 HIPAA also requires covered entities that share PHI with
business associates to obtain “satisfactory assurances that the business associates will
safeguard all PHI.” 165 A business associate is a “person or entity that performs certain
functions or activities that involve the use or disclosure of protected health information
on behalf of, or provides services to, a covered entity.” 166 Examples include “legal,
accounting, consulting, data aggregation, management, and financial services
firms.”167 Business associates are required to use the information only as “permitted
and described in the binding agreement with the [covered associate]” 168 in order to
protect information that would be PHI as though it were possessed by a covered
entity.169 While historically the HIPAA Privacy Rule only held covered entities liable
for compliance failures, the OCR pursued its first action against a business associate
in 2016 for failing to impose sufficient policies to protect the PHI. 170 Of note, the OCR
seeks penalties for just that: the failure to protect PHI, not the failure to protect certain
PHI.
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 601 (“There is no support in the record, or in the experience of the two
States that New York has emulated, for an assumption that the security provisions of the
statute will be administered improperly.”).
159

Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (considering “the adequacy of safeguards to prevent
unauthorized disclosure.”).
160
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Id.
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24 C.F.R. § 164.303 (1996).
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John R. Clark, The Erosion of Privacy, 34 AIR MED. J. 240, 241 (Sept. 2015).
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24 C.F.R. § 164.303 (1996).
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Mark Bryant & Dominic G. Zerbi, Managing HIPAA Business Associate Compliance
Efforts, 94 J. NAT’L. MED. ASSOC. 290, 291 (May 2002).
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Carolina Curby-Lucier, OCR Clarifies Role of a Business Associate Under HIPAA Privacy
Rule, ONRAMP (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.onr.com/blog/ocr-clarifies-role-of-a-businessassociate-under-hipaa-privacy-rule/.
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When a governmental body receives health information from a covered entity, it
may be considered a business associate, subjecting the body to these federal privacy
laws. However, even if the governmental body was not considered a business
associate, HIPAA encourages third-party safeguarding to the extent it may do so under
statutory authority. 171 Thus, to allow government agencies to disseminate medical
information with no recourse would completely frustrate the purpose of HIPAA.
Medical information that did not rise to the level of constitutional protection would be
highly regulated and highly protected while in the hospital’s possession but afforded
no protection once sent to a governmental body. Moreover, state agents—possessing
the same information as physicians—would be held to a much lower standard than
physicians with respect to safeguarding medical information. Surely, if a physician
took to the newspapers or social media and disclosed his patients’ confidential
information in a comparable manner, the public would be in uproar. 172
A September 2011 report by the Health Research Institute likewise encourages
those in possession of medical data to protect it. 173 The report noted that more than
half of covered entities surveyed had reported at least one breach in the last two
years.174 To “bridge the gap between situations not specifically addressed under
current regulations,” the report proposed a number of strategies.175 Notably, it
recommended that covered entities adopt certain privacy or security controls that
business associates must agree to before they are eligible to work with the covered
entity. The report additionally recommended that all employees receive better training
and education on privacy and that covered entities hold their employees accountable
in order to “create a culture of confidentiality where everyone is responsible for
adhering to privacy standards.”176
The preceding examples are only a few of the cases, laws, and reports that endorse
the protection of health data. One need only google “medical privacy” or “keep
medical information private” to find numerous other sources calling for the same goal:
the safeguarding of medical data. Constitutionally protecting all medical data, as
opposed to permitting its disclosure, would be one more strategy to achieve that goal.

Has the Secretary Exceeded the HIPAA Statutory Authority by Requiring “Satisfactory
Assurances” for Disclosures to Business Associates?, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (July 26,
2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/232/may-i-notify-parents-beforetreating-child/index.html.
171

172

Alleged Social Media Retaliation by Doctor Breached HIPAA Privacy Rule, HIPAA J.
(Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.hipaajournal.com/alleged-social-media-retaliation-by-doctorbreached-hipaa-privacy-rule-8735/ (describing punishment faced by physician who posted
retaliatory video footage of a patient to social media).
173

Report Addresses Identity Theft and Security Breach Strategies for the Health Care
Industry, PULSE (Dec. 2011), http://socredit.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Dec-2011.pdf.
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2. Protecting all Medical Information Simplifies the Courts’ Balancing Test
In addition to furthering society’s interest in protecting medical information,
protecting all medical data simplifies courts’ role in determining whether there is a
constitutional violation. Currently, most circuit courts must perform two balancing
tests. First, they must determine whether the medical condition is of a constitutionally
protected dimension, and if it is, then they must determine whether the government
has a legitimate interest in the information that outweighs the individual's interest in
nondisclosure. 177 By categorically considering medical information protected, courts
would only need to perform the latter test. This simplified balancing test would reduce
inconsistencies between the circuit courts as to which ailments are constitutionally
protected and which are not. No longer could one court extend protection to an
individual’s HIV status while another permitted its improper disclosure. One’s HIV
status would be categorically protected as medical information and thus courts would
begin straightaway with evaluating the government’s interest in the information.
While this ruling would seemingly protect anything from an individual’s HIV status
to his sprained pinky toe, the seriousness of the ailment would still be considered in
the second balancing test.178 The less serious the ailment and the less potential for
harm in any subsequent disclosure, the greater the likelihood that the intrusion into an
individual’s privacy would be justified. 179 Thus, courts like the Second and Sixth
Circuits that are reluctant to extend privacy protections to less serious diseases or those
not fundamentally private would be assured that the government would still likely be
permitted to acquire the information so long as they rightly need it.
3. Patients May be Less Forthcoming if They are Unsure Whether Their Information
is Protected
Lastly, patients have an expectation that their medical information will remain
private.180 If the courts have thus far been unable to reach a consensus as to what
information is protected, the patients whose information risks dissemination must
likewise be confused. Permitting baseless acquisition and dissemination of personal
Lee, 636 F.3d at 260 (“Only after a fundamental right is identified should the court proceed
to the next step of the analysis—the balancing of the government’s interest in disseminating
the information against the individual’s interest in keeping the information private.”); Ortlieb,
74 F. App’x at 857 (refusing to consider whether the government’s interest outweighed the
plaintiff’s right to privacy where plaintiff had no right to privacy in her x-rays).
177

178 Westinghouse, 638

F.2d at 578 (“The factors which should be considered in deciding whether
an intrusion into an individual's privacy is justified are the type of record requested, the
information it does or might contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual
disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated, the
adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree of need for access, and
whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable
public interest militating toward access.”); see also SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1140 (“Westinghouse
mandates a consideration of seven different factors.”).
179

Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.

180

Avila & Marshall, supra note 156 (“It all screams of privacy—privacy you expect.”).
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medical information may deter patients from seeking the care they need or erode trust
and candor with medical providers when patients are unsure what portions of their
record are susceptible to acquisition or dissemination. 181
The court in Whalen so conceded that “[u]nquestionably, some individuals’
concern for their own privacy may lead them to avoid or to postpone needed medical
attention.” 182 A study conducted by the Office of the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology quantified this concern and found that in 2013, 75% of
individuals surveyed were very or somewhat concerned with the privacy of their
medical information. 183 Roughly 8% admitted to having withheld information from
their healthcare providers due to their concerns with the privacy of their medical
information.184 These numbers reflect concerns with the privacy of information stored
in electronic medical records, an arena strictly regulated with little confusion as to
what is or is not protected from disclosure. Thus, it takes no stretch of the imagination
to predict even higher numbers should individuals be made more aware of state agents’
ability in certain jurisdictions to improperly acquire or disclose information with no
liability. By considering all medical information protected by the Constitution, courts
have the ability to temper people’s concerns over the privacy of their medical
information.
B. Congress Should Amend the Privacy Act to Permit Recovery for Emotional
Distress
Additionally, Congress should amend the Privacy Act to expressly permit recovery
for mental or emotional distress when state agents fail to properly handle medical
information. Doing so creates an alternative remedy for individuals in the Second and
Sixth Circuits who are afforded very little protection under the Constitution due to the
courts’ narrow interpretations of what medical conditions are protected under Whalen.
The Privacy Act of 1974 was passed in the “wake of the Watergate scandal in order
to regulate the treatment of personal information by the federal government.” 185 The
Act places a number of limitations on federal agencies’ abilities to “disclose, maintain,
collect, and use information.” 186 Specifically, it authorizes individuals to bring a civil
action and recover actual damages when an Executive Branch agency intentionally or
181

Tasha Glenn & Scott Monteith, Privacy in the Digital World: Medical and Health Data
Outside of HIPAA Protections, CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REPORTS 493, 493 (Sept. 14, 2014)
(“Trust between doctor and patient is fundamental to the practice of medicine. A patient must
trust the physician sufficiently to share personal details that may be stressful, embarrassing, or
potentially damaging.”).
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Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602.

Trends in individuals’ Perceptions regarding Privacy and Security of Medical Records and
Exchange of Health Information: 2012–2014, THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR
FOR HEALTH INFORMATION TECH. (Feb. 2016),
https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/briefs/privacy-and-security-trends-data-brief21616.pdf.
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willfully fails to manage confidential records “in such a way as to have an adverse
effect on an individual.” 187 However, the Supreme Court declined to interpret “actual
damages” as including damages for mental or emotional distress in Federal Aviation
Administration v. Cooper.188 The Court felt the term “actual damages” was ambiguous
and held that Congress must have intended that the term mean special damages for
proven pecuniary loss because Congress had declined to authorize general damages. 189
The issue with limiting “actual damages” to pecuniary losses is that the “primary, and
often only, damages sustained as a result of an invasion of privacy” are mental or
emotional distress. 190 Consequently, the Supreme Court “drastically limite[ed] the
situations that result in government liability.” 191 Not only must a plaintiff prove the
disclosure was willful, but she also must have suffered actual damage for which she
can be compensated such as physical injury or a job termination. Therefore, plaintiffs
who have fallen victim to inadvertent breaches or those who suffered only “torment,
anxiety, and . . . emotional stress wondering if and when this information will be used
against them” are effectively left with the Constitution as their only option for
recourse. 192
Thus, Congress should amend the Privacy Act to explicitly include damages for
mental or emotional distress. While this solution would not necessarily provide
recourse for those filing suit for an inadvertent disclosure of medical information, it
would provide an alternative remedy for individuals in the Second and Sixth Circuits
whose medical information has been intentionally disseminated by the government,
even if their information did not rise to a constitutionally protected dimension. Until
there is consistency among the circuit courts as to what medical information is
constitutionally protected, permitting recovery for emotional distress under the
Privacy Act would at least level the playing field for those afforded little ability to sue
under the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The increasing use of electronic medical records and the ease with which highly
personal data may be wrongfully disseminated, stolen, or victim to breach has brought
much needed attention to the issue of informational privacy. 193 While there is
extensive legislation and literature discussing the issue of privacy in the doctor-patient
187

5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D) (2014).
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Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 287 (2012).
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Id. at 286.

Id. at 304 (Sotomayer, J. dissenting) (“Consequently, individuals can no longer recover
what our precedents and common sense understand to be the primary, and often only,
damages sustained as a result of an invasion of privacy, namely mental or emotional
distress.”).
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Seeley, supra note 25, at 1355 (“Data breaches occur with increasing regulatiry, leading
some to question if the current statutory and regulatory schemes properly incentivize the
maintenance of adequate security measures amongst federal agencies.”).
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arena, the extent to which government agencies must protect sensitive medical
information under the constitutional right to privacy remains far from settled.194 The
bulk of the confusion arises from an inability among circuit courts to determine which
medical conditions are protected under the Constitution.
Until the Supreme Court resolves this circuit split, courts that have not yet adopted
a stance as to what medical information is constitutionally protected should follow the
Third Circuit and protect all medical information. Considering all medical data
protected by the Constitution would not only incentivize government agencies to
safeguard the information, but it would temper the public’s already present concern
with data theft and breach. Additionally, Congress should amend the Privacy Act to
expressly permit recovery of damages for emotional or mental distress as these
damages are the primary and often only damages suffered from an invasion of privacy.
Individuals living in the Second and Sixth Circuits⎯with narrow interpretations of
what medical information is constitutionally protected⎯are without recourse under
the Constitution should their medical conditions not rise to a certain threshold. By
amending the Privacy Act to expressly include damages for emotional or mental
distress, Congress would be granting these citizens an ability to recover what they
would otherwise not have.
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Gilbert, supra note 27, at 1375.

